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ABSTRACT: The author in this manuscript tries to show that the latent intellectual and spiritual 
basis of some schools of Western philosophy was Christianity, and Western philosophy is often 
correlated to it in one way or another (sometimes paradoxically) – be it religious, atheistic or non-
theistic. That is true for Jean-Paul Sartre’s metaphysics. The concepts of subjectivity and 
personality are inseparably connected with the Western culture and philosophy, which were 
(among other) intrinsically generated by the intentions of religions of the “Bible root” – 
Christianity, in this case. As the “core” of existential philosophy in general are the problems of 
personality (“being-to-death”, “the border situations”, human freedom, choice, guiltiness, 
responsibility, alienation etc.) – so, its ideas are at the uttermost correlated to Christian 
anthropology. Nevertheless parallels of Sartre’s texts with Christian mystical and ascetic practices 
were not clearly demonstrated in any research yet. The author also demonstrates that contrary 
to his heralded “atheism” Sartre’s existentialism latently implies the ontological “melancholy for 
God” and that the “absence of God” was the cardinal principle for the composition of the whole 
Sartre’s metaphysics and his concepts of being, subjectivity and consciousness. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this essay, I am going to examine the latent Christian foundation in the 
existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre.1 Many investigations were dedicated to Sartre’s 
 
1 It is difficult to define the concept "existentialism" especially as "the existentialist" among the thinkers of 
this philosophical current only Sartre in his works of the 1940th —1950th named himself. During the 20th 
century so distinct thinkers as M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus, K. Jaspers, G. Marсel, M. de 
Unamuno, J. Ortega y Gasset, N. Berdyaev, L. Shestov, M. Buber, F. Rosenzweig, N. Abbagnano, P. 
Tillich, K. Bart, R. Bultmann and many others were referred to “existentialism”. At first sight, the 
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“atheism”. As Ronald E. Santori wrote: “Atheism appears to have become one of 
the trademarks of Sartre’s philosophy for both his admirers and critics, for both 
marginally informed readers and inquiring scholars of Sartre.” ([6] P. 62) Santori 
himself tries to show that Sartre’s initial basis for rejecting the existence of God 
was pre-philosophical, non-discursive, and flippant; that this rejection was rooted 
in an unreflective childhood intuition that “God does not exist”. Much has been 
said about Sartre’s idea of God as the ideal but contradictory and impossible 
synthesis of “being-in-itself ” and “being-for-itself ”.2 And while there has been some 
work on religious themes in Sartre’s writings,3 I will explicitly demonstrate the 
 
characteristics of this philosophical current are highly various. For example, Marcel and Sartre (as well as 
many others of the named thinkers) could hardly reach agreement at least on one important question. 
Therefore, to define the concept "existentialism" by means of a set of philosophical formulas would be 
incorrect. Any formula, rather extensional for the description of all tendencies of existential philosophizing, 
can be empty and senseless for the concrete example. More likely, saying "existentialism", we most often 
mean exactly "existential philosophy". The last concept is much more extended and also does not assume 
the accurately fixed program, credo, a conceptual framework etc. How in such situation is it possible to 
build the "family tree" of existential philosophy? Most likely, so: there are several repeating subject matters 
which are not necessarily connected with each other, however in the history of thought getting to a certain 
community. These subject matters are as follows: 1) personality and system; 2) intentionality of 
consciousness; 3) "temporality" of consciousness, 4) being and nothingness; 5) absurdity; 6) freedom 7) nature 
and value of choice; 8) the role of boundary experience (boundary situation); 9) alienation. The subject 
matter of being and nothingness in the context of religious and non-religious existential philosophy is the 
most important.  Existential philosophy revived ontology as opposed to gnoseology, logic and epistemology 
prevailing in the philosophy of the 2 half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. From the point 
of view of “classical” religious existential philosophy (K. Jaspers, G. Marcel, M. Buber, P. Tillich, K. Bart, 
N. Berdyaev, L. Shestov, etc.) the transcendent is God. According to Heidegger, Sartre and Camus, the 
transcendent is nothingness, acting as the deepest mystery of existence. Existential thinkers sought to 
understand being as spontaneously given and strived to overcome both rationalism, and empiricism of 
traditional philosophy. Being, according to existential philosophy, is neither the “idea”, or the intelligible 
essence of idealistic philosophy, nor the empirical reality given in the perception. The main definition of 
being as it is opened for us, our own being, existence, is its fintude, mortality, "being-to-death". The person 
is the only entity in the world to whom his mortality, and together with it being is known.  
2 The introduction of terms follows in the course of paper. 
3 We consider the most profound research in this aspect Mark Meyer’s article Liminality and the problem of 
Being-in-the-world: Reflections on Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. [4] We also agree with ideas of frustrating “absence of 
God” in Sartre in Stephen A. Dinan’s paper The Tanatizing Absence of God [1] Most impressive in our context 
is the research of Steven W. Laycock Nothingness and Emptiness: Exorcising the shadow of God in Sartre [3]. It is 
necessary to mention also: (2014) Gillespie, John ‘Sartre and God: A Spiritual Odyssey, Part 2’// Sartre Studies 
International 20(1); (2013) Gillespie, John ‘Sartre and God: A Spiritual Odyssey, Part 1’// Sartre Studies 
International 19(1); (1981) Howells, Christina (1981) ‘Sartre and Negative Theology’// Modern Language 
Review 76; (1974) King, Thomas (1974) Sartre and the Sacred, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; (2015) 
Kirkpatrick, Kate ‘Sartre: An Augustinian Atheist?// Sartre Studies International, 21(1); (2013) ‘Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Mystical Atheist or Mystical Antipathist?’// European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5(2); (2009) Wang, 
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parallels of Sartre’s texts and Christian ascetic and mystical practices in this 
article. I also try to show that against his proclaimed “atheism” Sartre’s 
philosophy implicitly embraces an ontological “melancholy for God” and that 
the “absence of God” was the primary principle for the formation of Sartre’s 
metaphysical system, including his concepts of being and consciousness. At the 
“core” of existential philosophy (be it religious or non-religious, theistic or non-
theistic) there are   problems of personality (“being-to-death”, “the border 
situations”, human freedom, moral choice, guiltiness, responsibility, etc.), and 
through my reading of Sartre I will show that these ideas are rooted in and 
connected to Christian anthropology. 
2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF J -P. SARTRE’S METAPHYSICS  
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 – 1980) was a renowned French philosopher, writer, 
publicist, playwright, cultural critic, and one of the outstanding representatives of 
existential philosophy. Sartre drew on and developed the idea of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Heidegger's “fundamental ontology”, and also Hegel's 
philosophy – mainly through Alexandre Kojève's interpretation. The key themes 
of Sartre’s philosophy were: consciousness, human existence and action. The 
analysis of consciousness was undertaken by Sartre from a specific perspective: it 
is not consciousness as a “cognitive” capacity, but being of consciousness. This 
approach meant that Sartre was critical of the previous and dominant 
philosophical traditions, both rationalistic and empirical, which unjustifiably, in 
his opinion, "gnoseologized” philosophy. According to Sartre, consciousness is a 
special type of being; it is a specific reality "concerned" with its own existence. 
Starting with Kierkegaard, existential thinkers claimed that the person had no 
purpose or essence which was given to him by God or set by nature; each of us 
has to choose who we are and what we are going to be. Sartre paraphrases 
Descartes: "I am. Therefore, I think". ([8] p. 39) General view of the Medieval 
nominalists is reproduced here in some sense: i. e., that existence precedes 
essence. Sartre’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction allowed 
him also to make away completely with the Enlightement concept of "human 
nature". The latter was “put outside brackets" irrespectively of in what look it 
 
Stephen (2009) Aquinas and Sartre: On Freedom, Personal Identity, and the Possibility of Happiness, Washington D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press. 
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appeared: our “universal capability of thinking”, our “universal capability of 
perception”, the “moral law”, the “will to power” or the “libido”. 
Sartre develops his ideas about consciousness and human existence in his opus 
magnum: "Being and Nothingness" – (1943). In this text, the classic dualistic relations 
between being and thinking, nature and spirit, matter and consciousness, object 
and subject, world and human being, external and internal, signified and 
signifying, and natural and artificial are transferred to a plane of two “regions” 
of  Being: “being-in-itself ” (l’être en-soi) and “being-for-itself ” (l’être pour-soi). In such 
a way Sartre is trying to overcome the traditional dualisms and oppositions in 
Western philosophy. “Being-in-itself ” is “self-identical”, “non-decomposed”, 
“dense”, “massive” and “compact”. It is an absolute passivity; it is what it is, no 
more than that, and any definitions are incapable of describing it. It is 
indiscernible, undifferentiated, deprived of any qualitative definiteness and it is 
self-sufficient; it does not even comprise any distinction between “this” and “that”. 
This means that only the consciousness (“being-for-itself ”) introduces distinctions 
and identities into the world: discreteness, plurality, causality, variability, 
movement, quantity, quality, form, space, time (and, accordingly, mortal destiny), 
sense, meaning, good, harm, evil, etc. All of this descends from the consciousness 
which is equal to the subject. (It is true for the “formed” Sartre, since his “Being 
and Nothingness”). 
Sartre’s “phenomenal” account of consciousness was developed through 
rejection of Kant’s conception of a “noumenal” realm. Kant believed that we 
have no direct way of perceiving the external world and that all we have access 
to – it is our ideas of the world, including what our senses give us. Kant 
distinguished between phenomena, which are our perceptions of things or how 
things appear to us, and noumena, which are the things in themselves, which we 
have no knowledge of. Against Kant, Sartre argues that the appearance of a 
phenomenon is pure and absolute. The noumenon is not inaccessible—it simply 
“is not there”. Appearance is the only reality. From this starting point, Sartre 
contends that the world can be seen as an infinite series of finite appearances. 
Such a perspective does away with the above dualisms, especially the duality that 
contrasts the inside and the outside of a human subject. Consciousness is not 
reduced to knowledge. “Consciousness is not a mode of particular knowledge 
which may be called an inner meaning of self-knowledge; it is the dimension of 
trans-phenomenal being of the subject.” ([7] p. Ix).  
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Paraphrasing Heidegger, Sartre wrote: “Consciousness is a being such that in 
its being, its being is in question.” ([7] p. 172) The life of consciousness in Sartre's 
description appears to be a permanent negation of external being and its own 
past, its previous conditions. Being "Nothing", Sartre’s person “secretes this 
Nothing as a gland secretes hormones”. ([7] p. 103) Sartre draws on descriptions 
of consciousness as negativity in earlier European philosophy. He quotes 
Spinoza's aphorism – “Any determination means negation” (“Omnis determinatio est 
negatio”). Hegel admired this saying, and reformulated it into the judgment “The 
Spirit is negativity”. Sartre’s version of a person’s being as negativity may sound 
this way: in the world there is freedom thanks to the existence of Nothingness in 
it – that is the human being. Sartre writes: “We set out upon our pursuit of being 
and it seemed to us that the series of our questions had lead us to the heart of 
being. But behold, at the moment when we thought we were arriving at the goal, 
a glance cast on the question itself has revealed to us suddenly that we are 
encompassed with Nothingness. The permanent possibility of non-being outside 
us and within, conditions our questions about being.” ([7] p. 5) This means 
(among other things) that there’s no predestination for a person. If there is no 
predestination, then the subject of a choice is always burdened by the realization 
that from a set of potential opportunities he has to choose one without knowing 
if it is really the right one. Owing to this uncertainty, the subject always suffers of 
anxiety – the implicit understanding that he could act differently while the 
preferred choice is not guaranteed to be the best. By means of denial the human 
reality claims that it is what it is not, is not equal to itself, is not self-sufficient, is 
endured as anxiety. Anxiety in this case is the dread of a person before his own 
freedom. “It is in anxiety that man gains consciousness of his freedom, or, if you 
prefer, anxiety is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is 
anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself.” ([7] p. 29). There is no 
escape from this freedom because all our acts are essentially undetermined, they 
can always be different. What is more, choosing one opportunity involves the 
negation of all other opportunities. The Nothingness of our negating 
consciousness and opposite to it "being-in-itself " make an aprioristic ontological 
"framework" in which Sartre’s person deconstructs his subjectivity. The 
permanent creativity of consciousness means simultaneously the permanent 
choice and non-choice of oneself in the world. The choosing act of consciousness 
is a transformation into "Nothingness" for every new choice neutralizes the 
previous experience.  Consciousness appears to be a set of free acts of self-
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determination by a person in his being.  The theme of human freedom is the axis 
of all Sartre’s doctrine and it can be traced throughout his writings: it is melancholic in 
the novel “Nausea”, it has a stoical firmness in “Being and Nothingness”, it is linked with a 
heroic apathy in “The Roads of Freedom”, and it is exemplified by passionate criticism in 
“The Critic of the Dialectical Reason” (1960). 
Consciousness is in contact with being not through cognition, but through 
certain direct experiences. Sartre wrote: " Being will be disclosed to us by some 
kind of immediate access – boredom, nausea, etc.” ([7] p. xlviii) In the same time, 
the permanently negating consciousness itself becomes the "total emptiness". In 
"The Transcendence of Ego" (1936) Sartre regards the relation of empty transcendental 
consciousness to mental and psychic as to something external. All this will be 
explained in detail in the following subjection. 
Sartre’s definition of consciousness as “being-for-itself ” means “not-in-itself ”: 
it is not equal to itself, but is instead directed towards something external to 
consciousness – a table, a chair, a tree, a rat’s tail, Hegel’s Absolute Idea, lost 
youth, actual infinity, self-consciousness etc. – everything one can think about. 
Consciousness is intentional (in this aspect Sartre follows Husserl). The fact that 
consciousness is directed towards "something" means that it is not that 
"something"; put otherwise, consciousness is “Nothing”, or it is “empty”. The 
analogy with the Christian mystic theology following the neo-platonic tradition 
(Jan van Ruysbroek, Johannes Tauler, Meister Eckhart, Jacob Böhme, Angelus 
Silesius etc.) that defined God as “none of created things”, as "Nothing", is rather 
transparent here. “For God is Nothing: not in the sense of having no being. He 
is neither this nor that that one can speak of. He is beingless being.” ([2] p. 316-317) 
The world as "being-in-itself " is absolutely indifferent to consciousness, or 
"being-for-itself ". Within a person, the world’s indifference generates a double 
attitude concerning the world: either a disgust (“Nausea”), or a painful envy (“The 
Roads of Freedom”)4; and either case produces a “feeling” of an absolute alienation 
and rejectedness.  
Ascetic practices of "consciousness devastation" are present in almost all 
religions (especially in mystical currents), be it Christianity, Judaism (Kabbalah, 
Hasidism), Islam (Sufism), Brahmanism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. In this essay I 
will focus on Christianity, particularly Meister Eckhart’s (1260 – 1328) treatise 
 
4 Such painful envy Albert Camus also described in his novels (“The Stranger”, 1942) 
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"On Detachment".5 Meister Eckhart considered the detachment to be the most 
important of virtues, and he described what he believed to be the signs of the 
implantation of this virtue within the soul. So: 
 “Only pure detachment surpasses all things, for all virtues have some regard to 
creatures, but detachment is free of all creatures. 
You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands 
unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honor, shame, or disgrace, as a mountain 
of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. This immovable detachment brings a 
man into the greatest love to God. 
You must know that to be empty of all creatures is to be full of God.” ([2] p. 566-
567) 
For Sartre, consciousness "is devastated" not for the sake of perception of God, 
but for the sake of "pure nihilation"; this "defect" (“defect” from the point of view 
of Christian anthropology) generates within the person "melancholy" and 
"anxiety" – from the fact that consciousness is absolutely free, "omnipotent", 
sovereign and unconditioned, it does not find any “worthy” "object of filling" 
(which God in Christian mysticism is). Just God (who does not exist!) could have 
been such “object”...  Therefore we can say that ontological "melancholy" of 
Sartre is a hidden melancholy for God.  
Many researchers think Sartre's innovation entails a synthesis of Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s philosophy. What distinguishes Sartre from Heidegger is the 
introduction of the notion of “I think” into his analysis of human beings. For 
Sartre, the possibility of an "exit" to the “world”, from which Husserl’s 
transcendental subject was brought, is opened thanks to the fundamental 
characteristic of transcendental consciousness – the intentionality, which was 
already spoken about above. And unlike Husserl’s appeal to pure representation, 
from Sartre’s point of view, the collision between consciousness and the "dense" 
and "intractable" material world, opposite to consciousness, is most important. 
The material world appears to the person as alien and hostile. Sartre wrote in the 
“Critique of Dialectical Reason” (1960) that every moment we feel material reality as 
threat to our being, as resistance to our work, as a border of our knowledge. The 
person is surrounded with the world without which it cannot exist; he looks for 
supports in things, but does not find it. The thing has a quiet, self-sufficient 
 
5 Some of researches think that the text of treatise was prescribed to Eckhart.  
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condition of being, to it "the anxiety of future" is not known, “being-to-death" is 
not known.6 
The realization of the "anti-platonism" project in Sartre's metaphysics was 
implemented by him through the supreme "desubstantivation" of consciousness. 
Unlike Plato for whom the measure of being of a thing was defined by the degree 
of its participation in the Ideas and presence in the human mind, at Sartre being 
("being-in-itself ”) is absolutely "denuded of ideas" and is defined just by the 
resistance degree which it renders to the “neantizing activity” of consciousness. 
The atrocity with which consciousness neantizes the world implicitly indicates 
the superfluity of being of the material world and the continuous threat 
proceeding from it. The anti-platonic tendency of Sartre’s metaphysics is 
described in Nausea as the contact of consciousness and the material world which 
is disembarrassed from a verbal “peel”. The consciousness of the hero of the novel 
Antoine Roquentin "tears off varnishing" from things (we can call this varnish 
the form, the idea of a thing or its definite contours). This “tearing off ” occurs 
beyond any volition of the subject – it is the difference from the ascetic practices of 
different religions. Thereby a shapeless lot of material being appears which 
readily "assumes" any generation of Roquentin’s consciousness. The material 
being shows itself as matter, as naked materiality. It is perceived as something 
dense, massive, but soft and viscous, as impassable as a marshy jungle. In Nausea 
it is possible to draw strict analogies to Christian ascetics: nausea in Sartre's 
anthropology as if substitutes the Christian ascetic disgust for all that is carnal 
and material. The reaction of nausea, described in detail in the novel, is the 
subjective experience of encountering with naked materiality of the outside 
world. Nausea is not the empirical, but the ontological relation of consciousness 
to material being (res extensa). Sartre writes: "We must not take the term nausea 
as a metaphor derived from our physiological disgust. On the contrary, we must 
realize that it is on the foundation of this nausea that all concrete and empirical 
nauseas (nausea caused by spoiled meat, fresh blood, excrement, etc.) are 
produced and make us vomit.” ([7] p. 338-339) Nausea as an ontological 
measurement of consciousness demonstrates the superfluity of the material and 
 
6 One of the ways of disposal of this anxiety consists in narrowing as much as possible the circle of your 
opportunities. So the character of Patrick Süskind’s novel "The Pigeon" Ionathan Noel behaves himself. By 
the way, the story is written under the strongest influence of Sartre’s writings. 
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corporal per se… The “anti-platonic” strategy releases a person “from above”, 
according to Sartre. 
This is what Monsieur Roquentin endures: “Things have divorced their 
names. They are there, grotesque, headstrong, gigantic and it seems ridiculous to 
call them or to say anything at all about them: I am in the midst of things, 
nameless things. Alone, without words, defenceless; they surround me, are 
beneath me, behind me, above me. … I could no longer stand things being so 
close. … So I was in the park just now. The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk 
in the ground just under my bench. I could not remember it was a root any more. 
The words had vanished and with them the significance of things, their methods 
of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface. 
I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, knotty 
mass, entirely beasty, which frightened me. … The roots, the park gates, the 
bench, the sparse grass, all that has vanished: the diversity of things, their 
individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving 
soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder – naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness”. 
([8] p. 125-127) Here we see, I suppose, that the "protean" matter appears to 
Roquentin's look in absolutely other guises than it is “habitual" or "standard": 
the chestnut seems … anything, but not the "chestnut"! This is the “anti-thing” 
project in Sartre's metaphysics which releases the person "from below". The 
deprivation of the world of its "concreteness", “objectness” or “thingness” for the 
consciousness of an ordinary ("secular") Western person who is not engaged in 
ascetic practices, is extremely traumatic. About it, for example, E. Kassirer in his 
"Philosophies of symbolical forms" wrote much, and in psychiatry such syndrome 
has the name "agnosia". 7  
One more quote from Nausea illustrating the “agnosia” that Roquentin 
endures: “I lean my hand on the seat but pull it back hurriedly: it exists. This 
thing I'm sitting on, leaning my hand on, is called a seat. They made it purposely 
for people to sit on, they took leather, springs and cloth, they went to work with 
the idea of making a seat and when they finished, that was what they had made. 
They carried it here, into this car and the car is now rolling and jolting with its 
rattling windows, carrying this red thing in its bosom. I murmur: "It's a seat," a 
little like an exorcism. But the word stays on my lips: it refuses to go and put itself 
 
7 See also: Sacks, Oliver The man who mistook his wife for a hat and other clinical tales. Touchstone, 1998.  
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on the thing. It stays what it is, with its red plush, thousands of little red paws in 
the air, all still, little dead paws. This enormous belly turned upward, bleeding, 
inflated—bloated with all its dead paws, this belly floating in this car, in this grey 
sky, is not a seat. It could just as well be a dead donkey tossed about in the water, 
floating with the current, belly in the air in a great grey river, a river of floods; 
and I could be sitting on the donkey's belly, my feet dangling in the clear water.” 
([8] p. 124) And such "visions" could play a positive role even in the Western 
secular world – for example, to serve inspiration for surrealist artists such as René 
Magritte, Salvador Dalí, Max Ernst etc.  
Parallels between Sartre and Christian ascetics can further be seen by looking 
at St. John Chrysostom.8  He wrote: “The groundwork of this corporeal beauty 
is nothing but phlegm, and blood, and humor, and bile, and the fluid of 
masticated food. For by these things both eyes and cheeks, and all other features, 
are supplied with moisture; and if they do not receive that moisture, daily skin 
becoming unduly withered, and the eyes sunken, the whole grace of the 
countenance immediately vanishes; so that if you consider what is stored up 
inside those beautiful eyes, and that straight nose, and the mouth and the cheeks, 
you will affirm the well-shaped body to be nothing else than a whited sepulchre; 
the parts within are full of so much uncleanness. Moreover when you see a rag 
with any of these things on it, such as phlegm, or spittle you can not bear to touch 
it with even the tips of your fingers, nay you cannot even endure looking at it; 
and yet are you in a flutter of excitement about the storehouses 
and depositories of these things?!” [7]   The reader may say: "Well, here it is 
spoken about overcoming of the desire to women's flesh and female beauty, but 
not about disgust for "material" (res extensa) as such." Certainly. But the principle 
of disgust from "fleshness" (not only in aspect of sexual desire) is undoubtedly 
present in the Christian ascetics (as that we saw in the example of Meister 
Eckhart). 
 
 
8 St. John Chrysostome (c. 349 – 407), the Archbisop of Constantinopole, was one of the most important  
Early Church Fathers. He is known for his preaching and public speaking, for his denunciation of abuse of 
authority by both ecclesiastical and political leaders, “The Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom” and his ascetic 
sensibilities (which are so important for us, in this context). The epithet “Chrysostomos” means “golden-
mouthed” in Greek and denotes his celebrate eloquence. St. John Chysostom was among the most prolific 
authors in the Early Christian Church exceeded only by St. Augustine (c. 354 – 430) in the quality of his 
surviving writings.    
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Perhaps, Hamlet's maxim is also similar to Sartre’s Nausea: 
“O, that this too too solid flesh would melt 
 Thaw and resolve itself into a dew! 
 Or that the Everlasting had not fix'd  
 His canon ‘gainst self-slaughter! 
 O God! God! How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable,  
 Seem to me all the uses of this world!” [11] 
Hamlet's thoughts hardly stay directly in line with Christian anthropology and 
the doctrine of the Fathers of the Church, but in this case the feeling of 
"superfluity" of the carnal ("this too too solid flesh"), the desire "to melt” (dissolve) 
it, feeling that "all the uses of this world " are “weary, stale, flat and unprofitable” 
– it is quite comparable with Sartre’s "nausea". 
4. ME AND OTHER: THE FAILURE OF DIALOGUE 
Together with other definitions, for the Christians God is the most intimate and 
loved person. Here primarily a problem also rises in existential philosophy: what 
is other person? What is, according to Sartre, the “Other” for me and me for 
him? These relations first present themselves in the form of the Look. The 
primary attitude of consciousness towards another I is a pure and simple denial: 
just as "being-for-itself " is self-defined negatively towards "being-in-itself " it also 
finds the Other as "not being me". Generating inter-mutual denial from another 
I, the consciousness of Sartre’s person enters a struggle which originally proceeds 
as a wearisome fight of Looks. The role of a Look is ambivalent. On the one 
hand, the Look of the Other awakens my consciousness about myself: the person 
is present before his own consciousness to the extent that he is an object for the 
Other. Sartre again paraphrases Descartes: "I am seen, therefore I am". ([9], p. 
407) But the primary abnegation by means of which the subject reduces himself 
to "naked" objectivity generates a protest in him because the Other, by turning 
me into the object of consideration, alienates me from my world and my 
opportunities. The Other "alienates my freedom", I am depicted in his eyes in a 
certain "static character" as a fragment of "being-in-itself "; the Other is "the 
hidden death of my possibilities" ([7] p. 264), says Sartre. As one of the characters 
in Sartre’s drama "No exit" Garcin says: "Hell is other people". ([9] p. 31) The 
point here is that the Other knows about your offense or crime and it is forever 
imprinted in his Look: you will never be able to change it, you are not free any 
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more, you "fossilate". Sartre thinks this is the true meaning of the myth about 
petrifaction through the look of Medusa Gorgona. 
Here we see in Sartre a Biblical image of Original Sin9 and God's "Look" – the 
“Look” of the Other in his absolute measurement. "The shame appears in the 
profane, psycholgized version of Fear rooted in an “original sin” and described 
by Kierkegaard in his "The Concept of Anxiety". The shame is the feeling of an 
Original Sin not because I had made this or that offense, but just because I "am 
thrown" into the world, into the environment of things and that I need the 
mediation of the Other to be that what I am; bashfulness and in particular fear 
to be seen naked are only the symbolical specification of the initial shame; the 
body symbolizes our defenselessness and objectness here. To put on cloth – 
means to hide your objectness, to assert the right to see, without being seen by 
the Other, that is to be a pure subject. From here the biblical symbol of falling 
after original sin arises; it defines that Adam and Eve "know that they are 
naked".” ([7] p. 289) 
We will now examine one more important subject matter in Sartre. For 
Sartre, in human relationships the desire, and particularly sexual desire, appears 
to be the main thing. Contrary to Freud, Sartre brings desire out of the area of 
unconscious and ontologizes it as a mode of consciousness, “being-for-itself ”. And 
what to do with human body, with "flesh"? Sartre cannot (and does not want) to 
deny that consciousness cannot exist out of the body. But then there is a danger 
of "physiologism" which Sartre rejects initially, – in favor of "ontologism". Sartre 
finds a way out: he considers a body at the ontological level as "an initial body" 
or “an ontological body”, and at the psychological level – as "a psychic body". 
Thus in Sartre, as well as in Christianity, the human being becomes the arena of 
struggle of physiological / psychic and mental mechanisms (passions and spirit, 
in Christianity). Sartre insists on the triumph of reflection in which neantizing 
ecstasy the "initial" (ontological) body approves its freedom, that is tears away the 
psyche, as well as physiology, outside, into "being-in-itself ".10 We can compare 
Sartre’s "overcoming of corporality" with Christian ascetics as this "overcoming" 
 
9 Some of XX century Protestant theologians interpreted the Original Sin as the state of human total 
alienation (Paul Tillich) or as the “ungenuine (uneigentlich) existence” (Rudolf Bultmann, following 
Heidegger).    
10 Here the parallel also with the Brahmanist and Buddhist ascetics where the world of individual psyche is 
considered the "thin corporality" which is subject to elimination is rather obvious. 
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is some kind of imperative included in Sartre’s concern for a metaphysical release 
of a person from the body as the body and even the psyche represent a real threat 
for freedom of consciousness. (Just like in Christian ascetics where the body, flash 
and passions represent a threat for human spirit’s freedom and its intention 
towards God).      
Nevertheless, having denied "being-in-itself ", “being-for-itself ” tries to build 
a “bridge” to it again due to "desire" and also the fact that consciousness is always 
the denial, including the denial of its own previous states. The search for self-
sufficiency in which the Cartesian God or Spinoza’s Substance stay means the 
aspiration to synthesis by merging two initially separate regions of being: "being-
in-itself-for-itself ". Alas, it is impossible: consciousness ("being-for-itself ") gets 
"bogged down" and "sinks" in matter: "It symbolizes the sugary death of the “for-
itself ” (like that of the wasp which sinks into the jam and drowns in it)." ([7] p. 
609) The failure of such human enterprise in a metaphysical sense is inevitable 
because "being-for-itself " is always equal to Nothing. This synthesis, Sartre 
emphasizes, is impossible also because in trying to prove himself as being, and 
not "nothing", the person would destroy himself as a person, as freedom. An ideal 
of consciousness which would be the basis for its own "being-in-itself ", according 
to Sartre, could be called God. The impossibility to become God also turns the 
person into what Sartre called "unavailing passion" or "frustrated God". Sartre 
wrote: "Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-world 
succeeded in realizing only a missing God. Everything happens therefore as if the 
“in-itself ” and the “for-itself ” were presented in a state of disintegration in 
relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that the integration has ever taken place but on 
the contrary precisely because it is always indicated and always impossible." ([7] 
p. 623) 
There is one more parallel between Sartre and Christian theology – now of 
the 20th century. Sartre says: “If I posit God as the absolute unity of the subject 
which can in no way become an object (italics mine – T. L.), I thereby posit the eternity 
of my being-as-object and so perpetuate my shame. This is shame before God; 
that is, the recognition of my being-an-object before a subject which can never 
become an object. By the same stroke I realize my object-state in the absolute, 
and hypostasize it. The position of God is accompanied by a reification of my 
object-ness. Or better yet, I posit my being-an-object-for-God as more real than 
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myself; I exist alienated and I cause myself to learn from outside what I must be.” 
([7] p. 290) In this context Sartre's views correspond to some extent to views of 
many modern Christian theologians. For example, Paul Tillich (1886 – 1965) 
claimed that the question of existence or non-existence of God does not make 
sense as God in principle cannot be a “thing”, an object – even the "highest" 
object, being "above" all other objects. Tillich sought to keep himself separate 
from classical Christian theism.11 He wrote: "If you start with the question 
whether God does or does not exist, you will never reach Him; and if you assert 
that He exists, then it will be even more difficult for you to reach Him than if you 
denied His existence. God about whose existence or non-existence you can argue 
is a thing beside others objects within the universe of existing things. […] 
Therefore the question of is quite reasonable whether this thing exists, and the 
answer is so reasonable that it does not exist". [8] 
In his work “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1946) Sartre says: “The existentialist 
finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with 
Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer 
be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. 
It is no-where written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not 
lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once 
wrote: “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted”; and that, for 
existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does 
not exist, and man is in consequence “thrown”, for he cannot find anything to 
depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is 
without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able 
to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other 
words, there is no determinism – man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other 
 
11 Classical theism is the philosophical and theological doctrine which postulated God as the 
absolutely metaphysically ultimate being in contrast to other conceptions such as pantheism or 
polytheism. Whereas most of “classical” theists agree that God is, at a minimum, the all-knowing, 
all-mighty and completely Good, some classical theists go further and conceive God as 
completely transcendent (totally independent of all entities) and having such attributes as 
immutability, impassibility and timelessness. Classical theism (both Christian, Judaic and Islamic) 
was, historically (until the 20th century), the mainstream view in theology and philosophy and was 
associated with the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus (neo-platonism in general), St. 
Augustine, St. Anselm, Maimonides, Averroes, St. Thomas Aquinas etc.  
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hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that 
could legitimize our behavior. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in 
a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. – We are left 
alone, without excuse.” ([10] p. 8) Here in Sartre we can see paradoxically a 
Christian connotation of “thrownness”, "fall" into the world12 and also God-
rejectedness at Fathers of the Church (desolitudo, deseritudo). If God does not exist – 
so, only a person himself, according to Sartre, becomes responsible for all acts 
and events in the world regardless of any circumstances. He is responsible also 
for his being, for his tragic absolute freedom. And again there are allusions to the 
Gospels, to the Via Dolorosa of Jesus: "to shoulder one’s own being", "to bear 
being" … 
I will now return to what I began with: the idea of ontological 
"incompleteness", freedom and opportunity for the person to change radically at 
any time, inherent in all existential tradition and Christian anthropology. In 
general, the "metanoia" (repentance) can happen in any direction: it is possible 
to transsubstantiate from Saul of Tarsus to Paul the Apostle or "to transverse" on 
a Cross an instant before death as the Penitent Thief Dysmas. But it is possible 
also vice versa. "If you think you are standing firm, be careful that you don’t fall!" 
[I Cor. 10:12] And Sartre says: "There is always a possibility for the coward to 
give up cowardice and for the hero to stop being a hero." ([10] p. 25)   
The implicit dependence on God in Sartre is everywhere. The melancholy 
for God "exudes" from Sartre's texts – as water on the dried-up water meadow: 
it is not visible, until you step on the grass… He writes: "All of us are guilty, all 
are entriable". ([7] p. 557) Here we see again a Bible (Christian) image of an 
Original sin and – the idea of God “guilty in His absence”. 
Steven W. Laycock in his paper “Nothingness and emptiness: Exorcising the 
shadow of God in Sartre” (1991) demonstrates that “the shadow of God” which 
is “exorcised into the door” (by means of rationalistic speculations) comes back 
“through the window” – in a form of the melancholy for God (which is not always 
explicitly expressed) and a total dependence of a subject from the “Absent God”.  
Laycock writes: “The very notion of God in Sartre is deeply aporetic. Like the 
collision of matter and anti-matter, the alloyage of the two radically antagonistic 
 
12 See also Heidegger’s “Geworfenheit”. 
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attributes is cataclysmic, leaving, not a world without center, though a world 
without “positive” God, to be sure, the “center” remaining a vacuous reference 
point, the “eye” of a hurricane, ground-zero for a universal explosion. At the 
center lies an absence, not a presence. This absence, this “shadow”, is the 
inversion of God, a “negative” God, an evacuated God. And the man must 
comprise the great and momentous Absence of God, the Absence which is God”. 
([3] p. 396-397) 
Existential philosophy, as the 20th century demonstrated, is neutral between 
religion and atheism. Everything depends on the perspective of the particular 
thinker (or reader?). It is beyond doubt that one of the primary spiritual and 
cultural origins of the Western culture is Christianity, and that Western 
philosophy is related to it – be it religious, atheistic or non-theistic. And since 
existential philosophy is concerned in the problems of the personality (freedom, 
guiltiness, responsibility, “being-to-death”, choice etc.), it is connected to 
Christian anthropology. All this is applicable to Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy. 
Sartre’s concept of consciousness opposed to a material world which threatens it 
is similar with Christian mystical and ascetics practices. Sartre's metaphysical 
rebelliousness testifies to his aspiration to total release of the person and together 
the acceptance by the person on himself “the burden of the world”, the 
responsibility for “everything”. This situation comprises the latent and great 
“melancholy for God”.   
 
School of Philosophy 
Faculty of Humanities 
Higher School of Economics 
National Research University 
Moscow 
Russian Federation 
tlifinceva@hse.ru,  
lifintsevatanya64@gmail.com 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Dinan S. A. The Tanatizing Absence of God / Proceedings of  the American Catholic   
Philosophical Association V. 65, 1991. Pp. 87-98 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 324 
2. Eckhart M. The Complete Mystical Works of  Meister Eckhart. Translated and Edited by 
Maurice N. Y., O'C. Walshe, 2009. Pp. 316-317, 566-567  
3. Laycock S. W. Nothingness and Emptiness: Exorcising the shadow of God / Man 
and World, 24 (1991). Pp. 395-407. 
4. Meyers M. Liminality and the problem of Being-in-the world: Reflections on Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty / Sartre Studies International V. 14 (1), 2008/ Pp. 78-105  
5. Santori R. E. Sartre’s adolescent rejection of God / Philosophy Today, V. 37, Issue 1.  
Spring 1993. Pp. 62-71 
6. Sartre J-P. Being and Nothingness. Transl. from French by Hazel E. Barnes. N. Y., 
Washington        Square Press, 1966.  
7. Sartre J-P. Nausea. Transl. from French by Lloyd Alexander. L.: Hamish Hamilton, 
1979.  
8. Sartre J.-P. “No exit” and three other plays. N. Y.: A Division of Random House, 1989.  
9. Sartre J.-P. Existentialism is a Humanism. Transl. from French by Philip Mairet. New 
Heaven, Yale University Press, 2007.  
10. Shakespeare W. Hamlet, Prince of  Denmark. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 
100-101. 
11. St. John Chrysostom. On the Priesthood, Ascetic Treatises, Homilies and Letters, Homilies on 
the Statues / The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996. Pp. 103-104.  
12. Tillich P. Theology of  Culture. N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. 4-5. 
 
